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Developing a Durable Right to Health
Care
Erin C. Fuse Brown*
ABSTRACT
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA)
signature accomplishment was the creation of a statutory right
to health care for the uninsured. This is a momentous change in
policy, addressing one of the most vexing social issues of our
time and affecting millions of people and billions of dollars of
the U.S. economy. This ambition and the degree of societal and
political debate leading up to the Act’s passage suggests that it
is a “superstatute,” a rare breed of statute that can, among other
things, create rights and institutions more typically thought to
be the province of constitutional undertaking. Nevertheless, the
structure of the ACA’s right to health care makes it fragile and
reduces its chances of becoming a durable right. The ACA may
end up as a “quasi-superstatute:” a statute that aspires but fails
to become a superstatute through a failure of political and
public entrenchment. The problem is that the right to health
care is to be delivered largely through changes to the private
health insurance market, requiring the collective action of many
reluctant actors, including unwilling states and recalcitrant
individuals. Even though it survived legal challenge before the
Supreme Court, the ACA’s right to health care faces significant
political and market challenges that threaten to retrench rather
than entrench its benefits in the public’s mind. The vulnerability
of this right to health care is concentrated early in its lifespan,
and if it survives these early years, forces such as the
endowment effect may strengthen the right’s durability as its
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benefits take hold. The fragility of the ACA’s right to health care
and its uncertain path to durability provide lessons to future
framers of a right to health care regarding the long timeframe
for implementation, uncertainty, complexity, and structure. The
risk of becoming a “quasi-superstatute” highlights the
importance of how such social reforms ought to be structured to
achieve entrenchment and durability after the ink is dry on the
new legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
Nikki White had aspired to become a physician when she
was diagnosed with lupus at the age of twenty-one. After her
diagnosis, she set that ambition aside, but she found work at a
hospital trauma unit that came with health insurance benefits.
After becoming too ill to continue her job, she lost her health
insurance coverage and moved back home to live with her
parents. For the next few years, she struggled to gain coverage
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through TennCare, her state’s Medicaid system, gaining
coverage only to lose it again when the program suffered cuts.
No private insurance company would cover her with a
preexisting medical condition. Although the vast majority of
lupus patients live a normal lifespan, it is an illness that
requires extensive medical management.1 Nikki was not so
lucky; she was rushed to the hospital after collapsing at home
and succumbed to her illness at the age of thirty-two in severe
pain, bleeding internally, and suffering multiple organ failure.
Her physicians believe that she would not have died had she
had health insurance and been able to receive proper care for
her disease. Instead, she joined the approximately 18,000
Americans who die every year from a lack of health care
coverage.2
Had she lived long enough, Nikki could have obtained
health care coverage under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA). Among its many provisions,
the ACA’s most significant is one that creates a right to health
care in this country for the uninsured.3 Having largely survived
legal challenge at the Supreme Court, this right is a
momentous change in American health policy. The practical
question for most people like Nikki White, however, is if they
lose their job or their health insurance, will the ACA provide a
meaningful right to health care that they can count on in the
future? The answer turns on whether the right to health care
created by the Act is durable. A durable right is a right that
will last for a long time without deterioration.
Analyzing the durability of the ACA’s right to health care
requires an evaluation of what makes a right durable. The
quintessential durable right is a constitutional right, which,
once established, is entrenched against political or partisan
attack through the difficult amendment process of the U.S.
Constitution. That may be one of the reasons scholars and
advocates alike look to the Constitution—a constitutional right

1. Jane Zhang, Amid Fight for Her Life, Lupus Patient Fights for
Insurance, POST-GAZETTE (Dec. 5, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/ pg/06339/743713-84.stm.
2. Nicholas D. Kristof, The Body Count at Home, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12,
2009, at WK18.
3. Barry Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy, The Art of Politics
and Persistence, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 447 (2011) (“The ACA
is . . . a reform of private employment insurance, intended to increase coverage
for those who are currently uninsured.”).
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comes with a level of structural entrenchment through Article
V amendment requirements, which makes the right resilient
against the political whims of the time. Contrary to the popular
and scholarly bias toward locating a right to health care in the
Constitution, there is no federal constitutional right to health
care.4 Instead the federal right to health care is largely a
creature of statute, which does not automatically come with
political protection or structural entrenchment.
In the context of a statutory right to health care, there is a
patchwork of federal statutes that cover various groups:
Medicare, Medicaid, the Veterans Administration health
system, TRICARE for active duty military and their families,
the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act
(EMTALA), and, most recently, the ACA. The right to health
care under the Medicare program, in particular, is an example
of a durable statutory right that has become a cherished and
politically entrenched right.5 The problem with the statutory
right to health care until now has been its patchwork nature,
covering only certain subpopulations and leaving in excess of
50 million uninsured.6 The ACA purports to fill in the gap by
extending a statutory right to health care to those previously
not covered by an existing federal statutory right or through
private health insurance. It is uncertain, however, whether the
ACA’s right to health care will become a durable right like the
right under Medicare, or whether it will fall short of its promise
of assuring access to health care for the uninsured.
The statutory nature of the right to health care in this
country is consistent with theories of sub-constitutionalism,
which posit that much of the constitutional work in this
country, namely creation of rights and governmental
institutions, is accomplished through statutory or regulatory
law.7 According to one vein of sub-constitutional scholarship
4. Puneet K. Sandhu, Comment, A Legal Right to Health Care: What Can
the United States Learn from Foreign Models of Health Rights Jurisprudence?,
95 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1162 (2007) (“Despite the moral, citizenship, and equal
opportunity rationales for a right to health care, the Supreme Court has not
recognized health care as a constitutional right.”).
5. Furrow, supra note 3, at 452–453.
6. Table HI05. Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage
by State and Age for All People: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/health/h05_000.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2012).
7. See generally Mark Tushnet, Subconstitutional Constitutional Law:
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popularized by William Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn, the
heavy lifting of sub-constitutionalism is accomplished through
a breed of federal statutes called “superstatutes.”8
Superstatutes address serious social problems and gain such
broad public support that they are entrenched against future
political attack.9 Three features distinguish superstatutes from
ordinary statutes: first, the statute must substantially alter the
existing regulatory baseline with a new principle or policy;
second, the statute is generated after a long period of public
deliberation; and third, the new principle or policy “sticks” in
the public culture such that it becomes a fundamental or
axiomatic legal norm.10
One way to create a durable right via statute is through a
superstatute. The same features that make a superstatute
“super,” namely public support and the entrenchment that
follows, also make the rights created by such a statute durable.
The ACA has the pedigree of a superstatute, achieving a
significant change from existing coverage baselines and the
largest expansion of health care access in a generation.11 The
legislation was undertaken to address the serious social
problem of lack of universal access to health care, following a
period of intense public and political debate and deliberation.
Nevertheless, the ACA is in a particularly vulnerable period,
and its prospects for creating a durable right to health care are,
at best, uncertain.
One limitation of the superstatutes theory is that it does
not describe how to predict whether a statute will be a
superstatute. Applying the criteria for superstatutes, it is
unknown at the outset whether a statute will become a
superstatute (and thus whether the rights it creates become
durable rights) until it has withstood the test of time. Some
statutes address important social problems and undergo
Supplement, Sham, or Substitute?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1871 (2001)
(providing a commentary on the use of subconstitutional doctrines).
8. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 26 (2010) [hereinafter A
REPUBLIC OF STATUTES].
9. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE
L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001).
10. Id. at 1230–31.
11. See Furrow, supra note 3, at 453–54 (“The ACA will harmonize health
care in the United States with the idea of universal coverage of all citizens as
a right, in large part by moving private health insurance closer to quasi-social
insurance.”).
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serious public deliberation, but somehow fail to live up to their
promise of solving the social challenge. These statutes may
reflect the aspirational characteristic of superstatutes, but fail
to become entrenched through widespread public support. I
propose that these would-be, but failed, superstatutes occupy
their own category called “quasi-superstatutes.” Quasisuperstatutes fall short of their “super” aspirations because the
rights or new legal norms they create are not fully accepted by
the public, either because the public does not agree with the
norm or because not enough of the public experiences the
benefits of the new right or legal norm before it is rolled back
by courts or future Congresses. Given that entrenchment is the
key to durability, assessing the aspects of a statute that will
make it more or less likely to become entrenched help predict
whether a statute will be a superstatute or quasi-superstatute.
This Article’s central claim is that although the ACA
creates a new right to health care for the uninsured, the
structure of this right to health care makes it fragile and more
likely to end up as a quasi-superstatute than a superstatute. In
particular, the ACA’s right to health care may be structurally
weaker than the right under other federal programs like
Medicare. Rather than creating a federally-funded and
administered benefit program that can rapidly deliver benefits
to wide population and gain support, the ACA bases its right on
private health insurance reforms with the following
vulnerabilities: (1) the right faces a long time-frame for
implementation without delivering benefits while susceptible to
political attacks; (2) judicial challenges to the individual
mandate and Medicaid provisions created uncertainty that
delayed implementation; and (3) the right depends on the
creation of a private insurance market through the collective
action of a host of potentially reluctant private actors, states,
and individuals.
The ACA’s uncertain path to durability depends largely on
whether it survives the long time period prior to
implementation of its benefits. Once its benefits begin, a
diverse interest group may emerge to defend the ACA’s right to
health care, including not only individuals who gain benefits,
but also the insurance companies and health care providers
who gain new customers and patients. The greater the sunk
costs by those implementing the reforms, the greater the
incentive to maintain the current arrangement rather than
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abandoning it for a new approach. If the fragility of the ACA’s
right to health care relegates it to the quasi-superstatute
category, its weaknesses provide several strategic lessons for
those continuing to seek a durable right to health care. In
particular, efforts to develop a durable right should deliver
benefits quickly, while avoiding statutory complexity that
makes it difficult for the public to understand its benefits and
legal uncertainty that inhibits implementation and confidence
among stakeholder groups.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the
current landscape of the federal right to health care in the
United States, tracing the absence of a broad, federal
constitutional right to health care and the statutory efforts to
fill the constitutional gaps, including how the ACA creates a
right to health care. Part II analyzes the durability of the
ACA’s right to health care, drawing on and expanding upon the
sub-constitutionalism literature and theory of superstatutes to
add a new category called “quasi-superstatutes” to capture
those that aspire to be, but fail to achieve the entrenchment
required to become a superstatute. Part III explores how the
ACA’s right to health care could survive despite its fragility as
well as the implications of the ACA’s prospects as a quasisuperstatute for efforts to develop a durable right to health care
in the United States.
I. CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
To understand what makes a right to health care durable,
the “right to health care” must be defined. The right to health
care is the non-excludable right to access and receive some
minimum level of health care services.12
The right to health care is distinct from the right to health.
Conceptually, a right to health is broader than a right to health
care, because a right to health encompasses all the actions
government can take to ensure the health of the population,
which would include not just health care services, but also
12. See Mark Earnest & Dayna Bowen Matthew, A Property Right to
Medical Care, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 65, 69 (2008) (recognizing a property interest
in health care, defined as “the medical goods and services that hospitals,
physicians, and other providers deliver”); Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1160 (“A
right to health care . . . entitles right-holders to the “goods and services” that
aid in the achievement of health and, consequently, obligates the government
to ensure access to these goods and services.”).
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adequate provision for the myriad social, economic, and
environmental determinants of health, such as housing,
education, employment, nutrition, and clean air and water.13
Such a right to health is often cast in the framework of human
rights and, due to the impossibility of guaranteeing the health
of all persons, is aspirational.14 As a precatory guiding
principle, such a broadly conceived right to health is nowhere to
be found in the U.S. Constitution and, as has been observed in
states with constitutional rights to health, is of limited utility
in terms of enforcement, justiciability, or delivery.15
This Article focuses on the narrower, legal right to health
care, rather than the right to health. Even the narrower
conception of a right to health care is difficult to define without
grappling with the normative and practical judgment of
defining what substantively ought to be included in a minimum
benefits package constrained by limited resources and capacity
of the health care delivery system. A minimum benefits
package to which everyone would have a basic right will also be
ever-evolving as new technologies and scientific discoveries

13. U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, General
Comment, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standards of Health, General
Comment, U.N. Doc. No. 14. CESCR, E/C. 12/2000/4, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/E.C.12.2000.4.En (“The Committee
interprets the right to health . . . as an inclusive right extending not only to
timely and appropriate health care but also to the underlying determinants of
health, such as access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, an
adequate supply of safe food, nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and
environmental conditions, and access to health-related education and
information, including on sexual and reproductive health.”).
14. William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and CrossSubsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L. REV.
279, 390 (2009) (“Obviously, no system can guarantee any particular level of
health.”); Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1160 (“A right to health implies that every
person is entitled to perfect health. Although perfect health may be achievable
at some point in the future, it is not a realistic benchmark against which to
adjudicate a right.”).
15. See Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right
to Health Care, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1325, 1392 (2010) (“More than a dozen
states give constitutional imprimatur to health. Judicial decisions in the seven
states examined demonstrate a general reluctance to recognize affirmative,
enforceable health rights. Indeed, there is not a single provision or case
supporting a universal right to publicly funded health care.”); see also Sandhu,
supra note 4, at 1158 (“[T]he problem of defining and implementing a right to
health is three-fold: indeterminacy (how to characterize it), justiciability (how
to enforce it), and progressive realization (how to raise the standard over
time).”).
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change the scope of medical care.16 Some have argued that the
right to health care should be defined as the amount of health
care that can be delivered in an equal manner, given the
country’s resources, to all of its citizens.17 Others propose that
the right ought to be defined by the level of care that society
may use its collective coercive power to make universally
accessible.18 In practice, the right to health care is often defined
in categorical terms, by types of services, level of coverage, and
consumer obligations and protections. This was the approach
taken by Congress in the ACA, defining an “essential benefits
package” as including items and services in certain general
categories.19 While development of the ACA’s definition of an
essential benefits package may have been informed by ethical
or human rights considerations, the essential benefits package
was based on what a typical U.S. employer-based health
benefits package covers.20 This fact underscores the point that

16. Daniel Callahan, What is the Reasonable Demand on Health Care
Resources? Designing a Basic Package of Benefits, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 1, 2 (1992) (“It has proven impossible, however, to use ‘medical need’ as
a single meaningful criterion for a basic health care package. Instead, that
package must be grounded in an array of ingredients—medical, ethical, social,
and political. More importantly, there must be a political dimension to the
idea of a basic package or at least some role for the public to express its own
values about what it believes is a minimally adequate level of care.”).
17. See Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1160 (“A right to health care may be
defined as equality of access: whatever health care resources society provides
must be provided to everyone on an equal basis.”); Kratzke, supra note 14, at
391–92 (“Disagreement over the extent of an entitlement to health care does
not focus on a minimum level of care but on what is an acceptable level of
(in)equality.”).
18. See Paul T. Menzel, The Cultural Moral Right to a Basic Minimum of
Accessible Health Care, 21 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 79, 90 (2011).
19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1302, 124 Stat. 119, 163–68 (2010) (including in the essential benefits package
the following services: (1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency services;
(3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) mental health and
substance use disorder services, including behavioral health treatment; (6)
prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; (8)
laboratory services; (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease
management; and (10) pediatric services, including oral and vision care). The
task of further explicating the details of the minimum benefits package is left,
like much of the ACA’s implementation, to the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).
20. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(2)(A). The
Institute of Medicine recommends the essential benefits package be modeled
after a typical small-group plan rather than large-group plan due to concerns
regarding affordability. See INST. OF MED., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS:
BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 86 (Cheryl Ulmer et al. eds., 2011).
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any practical definition of a right to health care in the United
States is inextricably tied to the health care delivery system
currently in existence, such that a right to health care is often
framed as a right to a basic level of health insurance. For all
but the extremely wealthy or supremely healthy, meaningful
access to health care services in the U.S. requires financing
through health insurance.21 Thus, the right to health care can
take the form of a right to non-excludable access to a minimum
level of health services that is financed through affordable
health insurance coverage.
This Part sets forth the current state of the federal right to
health care in this county, identifying the absence of a federal
constitutional right to health care and the existing federal
statutes that create rights to health care for a variety of subpopulations. It then examines the right to health care created
by the ACA and how its structure differs from other federal
rights to health care.
A. ABSENCE OF A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE
It is generally agreed that there is no broad right to health
or health care under the federal constitution.22 As other

21. See Mark A. Hall, Approaching Universal Coverage With Better SafetyNet Programs for the Uninsured, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 9, 9
(2011); Eleanor D. Kinney, Recognition of the International Human Right to
Health and Health Care in the United States, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 335, 356
(2008) (“Health insurance coverage is the most important means for assuring
that individuals have access to expensive health care services.”); Kratzke,
supra note 14, at 281 (“Health insurance is a payment system through which
Americans receive their medical care, even the predictable routine health care,
the cost of which should not be beyond the means of most of them.”). While the
right to health insurance is a proxy for the right to health care for most, it
remains conceivable that a right to health care could be fulfilled through the
direct provision of health care services, such as the services provided through
publicly funded clinics and safety-net hospitals. See Hall, supra note 21, at 9
(“Insurance, after all, is not an end in itself; it is the best means of access to
affordable care. But, if other means to minimally acceptable access exist, they
may provide a form of non-insurance, direct-access coverage that helps to fill
the remaining coverage gap for the uninsured.”).
22. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 1329 (“[T]he U.S. Constitution does not
explicitly or implicitly recognize health as a right.”); Tom Stacy, The Courts,
the Constitution, and a Just Distribution of Health Care, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 77, 82, 91 & n. 64 (1993–94) (“The Supreme Court has now rejected the
notion of a constitutional welfare right to health care and other basic goods,
such as education.”); Kenneth Wing, The Right to Health Care in the United
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scholars have argued extensively, the U.S. Constitution
provides neither a textual nor structural basis for such a
right.23 Health is never mentioned in the Constitution, a
document that is often described as providing a charter of
negative rights that limit government action rather than
impose any affirmative obligation of the government to provide
for the health or welfare of its citizens.24 Scholars have often
pointed to (and criticized) this feature of American
constitutionalism, comparing it to other countries’ or states’
constitutional obligations to provide their citizens health care
or other social and economic goods.25 Despite the limitations of
a conceptual dichotomy between positive rights (e.g.,
entitlements to social goods) or negative rights (e.g., liberties or
freedom from interference),26 this distinction is a useful
description of the federal constitutional posture toward a right
to health.27 For example, the Supreme Court has recognized

States, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 161, 162 (1993) (“[T]he United States
Constitution does not require the federal government, the state governments,
or any other level of government to protect the health of its citizens collectively
or individually.”).
23. See Leonard, supra note 15, at 1329 (“By contrast to several state
constitutions, the federal constitution does not expressly reference the word
“health” in any provision.”); Wing, supra note 22, at 162; see also Kinney,
supra note 21, at 353 (“The Federal Constitution is silent on the matters of
health and health care.”).
24. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself
requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens
against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased as a limitation on
the State’s power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety
and security.”); Barksy v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472–73 (1954)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The Bill of Rights does not say . . . . what
government must give, but rather what it may not take away.”); Jackson v.
City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Constitution is a
charter of negative rather than positive liberties. The men who wrote the Bill
of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the people
but that it might do too much to them.”); see also, Helen Hershkoff, “Just
Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social and
Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (2010) (“American
constitutionalism consistently is seen as excluding social and economic
rights.”).
25. See Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1154; see also Leonard, supra note 15, at
1391–92.
26. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 266–71 (1978).
27. Abigail Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209,
2211 (2011) (“Unlike the international human right to health, this American
freedom of health would operate primarily as a restriction on—rather than as
an obligation for—governmental regulation of medical decision-making.”).

FUSE BROWN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

450

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/11/2013 11:40 AM

[Vol. 14:1

certain negative rights involving health or health care under
the Due Process Clause: including the freedom of health care
decision-making, privacy, and access in the context of end of
life, health information privacy, and abortion under the Due
Process Clause.28 When government does provide health care
under benefit programs such as Medicare or Medicaid, the
benefits must be administered in accordance with the Equal
Protection Clause.29 Nevertheless, the Court has not recognized
a generally applicable positive right to health care, and it
seems unlikely ever to do so.30
An affirmative constitutional right to health care has been
recognized only in very limited circumstances, such as where
persons have lost the liberty to care for themselves. For
example, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment requires provision of medical
treatment to prisoners,31 and the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires the state to ensure the

28. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 443 (1972); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 723 (1997).
Cf. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990) (finding a Due
Process liberty interest in patient’s right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
but upholding state law requiring clear and convincing evidence of patient’s
wishes).
29. See Stacy, supra note 22, at 83 (“[W]hen government spends its
resources on goods that greatly influence a person’s life opportunities, such as
health care, it must do so in a way that[] promotes rough equality of access to
at least some minimally adequate level of opportunity.”); Wing, supra note 22,
at 164 (“In authorizing or implementing such programs as Medicaid,
Medicare, or any of the other federal, state, or local health care financing or
service activities, the government must comply with important
constitutionally-imposed constraints, particularly the nondiscrimination
requirements of equal protection and the ‘fairness’ requirements of due
process as imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”).
30. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 469 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970) (declining to
find welfare rights in the Constitution); Leonard, supra note 15, at 1330
(“Setting aside well-meaning proposals, the likelihood of a federal
constitutional amendment identifying health as a right is all but
unimaginable.”); see also Stacy, supra note 22, at 77 (“[A]nother unquestioned
premise holds that legislatures are the sole forum for any reform of the
distribution of health care, and that the Constitution, as interpreted and
enforced by the judiciary, has virtually nothing to say. It is understandable
that this premise should be taken for granted. As a practical matter, the
current Supreme Court will not significantly involve itself in this issue, and
any reform must emerge from Congress.”).
31. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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reasonable safety of the involuntarily committed.32 Scholars
have also advanced arguments for a constitutionally protected
property interest in health care from a federally-funded and subsidized delivery system or a constitutional right to access
potentially life-saving but non-FDA approved drugs or human
organs as a form of medical self-defense.33 These are narrow
exceptions (or proposed exceptions) to the general maxim that
the Constitution does not guarantee a broad right to health
care.
Perhaps the reason scholars and advocates continue to try
to locate a right to health care in the Constitution is that
constitutional recognition makes a right seem more permanent
or durable. Constitutional rights are structurally entrenched
against political encroachment because of the supremacy of the
Constitution relative to the laws of the political branches of
government and because of the difficult Article V amendment
process.34 Recognizing a constitutional right to health care also
conveys a normative message about the value of such a right to
the American people, consistent with the canonical reverence
with which Americans regard their founding document.35 From
a practical standpoint, those lamenting the legislature’s
longstanding political inability to act may be attracted to a
judicial recognition of a constitutional right to health care
because it would command the legislature to effectuate the
right.36 Despite this scholarly and popular bias toward
constitutional rights, existing federal rights to health care are
almost entirely statutory in derivation.
B. EXISTING FEDERAL STATUTORY RIGHTS TO HEALTH CARE
In the absence of a constitutional right to health care,

32. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
33. See Earnest & Matthew, supra note 12 at 69; Eugene Volokh, Essay,
Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1835 (2007).
34. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 115.
35. John F. Preis, Constitutional Enforcement By Proxy, 95 VA. L. REV.
1663, 1665–67 (2009) (noting that “Americans love their Constitution,” and
arguing that contrary to this constitutional preference, sub-constitutional law
may also be constitutive of the national order).
36. See Sandhu, supra note 4, at 1169 (“A constitutional right to
healthcare in the United States, or perhaps even the threat of a constitutional
amendment, would force political action to break the special interest logjam
that has bedeviled efforts at healthcare reform by obligating Congress to
address healthcare comprehensively.”).
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Congress has provided health care to various subgroups of the
U.S. population through statutes. These statutes create a right
to health care for those who fall within the covered categories,
primarily by creating a federally-funded benefit program and
committing to the provision or financing of health care services
for those eligible to participate.
The Medicare program provides coverage to citizens and
legal residents sixty-five and older, the disabled, those with
end-stage renal disease or amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou
Gehrig’s disease), and individuals exposed to certain
environmental health hazards.37 Medicaid and the Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP) are administered and
funded through federal-state cooperation to provide health care
services to eligible poor.38 Medicaid eligibility varies by state,
but currently extends only to a subgroup of the poor, including
children, pregnant women, the blind, and certain disabled and
elderly.39 The federal government also provides health care
coverage and services to active duty military members, retirees,
and their families under the TRICARE program40 and to
disabled and low-income veterans under the Veterans Health
Administration.41 According to 2009 census data, these
governmental programs collectively cover approximately thirtyone percent of the United States population.42 In other words,
about one-third of the population has a statutory right to
37. Social Security Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-384, 80 Stat. 99, 99–106
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006)); Pub. L. No. 110-27, 121 Stat. 111
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 426 (2006)); Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 119–
1024 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395rr-1 (2006)) (providing Medicare coverage
and medical screening services to individuals exposed to environmental health
hazards as a result of a public health emergency declaration under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA)).
38. Social Security Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006). CHIP was created
as part of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4901, 111
Stat. 251, 552 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj); see also Children’s
Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3,
123 Stat. 8 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.)
(financing CHIP through 2013).
39. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r-1.
40. 10 U.S.C. §§1071–1110 (2006).
41. 38 U.S.C. §§ 1710(a), 1722(a) (2006).
42. Table HI05. Health Insurance Coverage Status and Type of Coverage
by State and Age for All People: 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032010/health/h05_000.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Insurance Coverage Status].
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health care from one of these government programs. An
additional fifty-two percent of the population is covered
through some form of private insurance, whether employerbased or direct-purchased.43 As of 2009, the approximate
remaining seventeen percent of the population (50,674,000
persons) were uninsured.44
The statutory language of these benefit programs provides
the right to health care for covered individuals by either (1)
creating the benefit program and providing that eligible
individuals are entitled to enroll or (2) creating an obligation of
third parties (such as state governments or private actors) to
provide financing or services to eligible persons. For example,
the Medicare statute creates a right by stating that every
eligible individual “shall be entitled to hospital insurance
benefits” under Medicare’s hospital benefits program (Part A)
without having to pay hospital insurance premiums.45 All those
who are enrolled in Medicare Part A are eligible to enroll in
Part B,46 which covers non-hospital expenses such as
physicians’ and outpatient services. The Medicaid statute
requires state plans to provide “medical assistance” payments
for covered medical services to all eligible persons.47 Under
TRICARE’s statute, all members of a uniformed service are
entitled to medical and dental care in any military facility.48

43. Id. The 2009 census data report that sixty-four percent of the
population has some form of private health insurance, but of these,
approximately twelve also have government health insurance through
Medicare or Medicaid. Id.
44. Id.
45. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-384 § 226 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
426 (2006)); Social Security Act § 226A. Medicare hospital benefits (Part A) are
available without premiums to all those over age sixty-five who are eligible for
Social Security. For those who are not eligible for Social Security benefits
because, for example, they never worked or have never been married to
someone who worked, Medicare is available but requires payment of
premiums. For those who must pay premiums to obtain coverage, the statute
states that all such persons “shall be eligible to enroll” in Medicare Part A.
Social Security Act § 1818; Social Security Act § 1818A.
46. Social Security Act § 1836.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)–(B) (2006). Eligible persons include those
who fall into mandatory categories of eligibility (e.g., certain pregnant women
and children) and other optional categories determined by the state. Medicaid
also contains a nondiscrimination requirement that the medical assistance
provided to one person “shall not be less in amount, duration, or scope than
the medical assistance made available to any other such individual . . . .” 42
U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)–(B).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 1074(a)(1) (2006). Dependents of members of the
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EMTALA creates a right to emergency health care for
persons with an emergency medical condition, regardless of the
patient’s ability to pay.49 EMTALA embodies the nonexcludable nature of the right to health care, because
emergency care must be provided to anyone who shows up to
an emergency room with an emergency medical condition in
hospitals participating in Medicare. The right, however, is
limited in scope because it only requires hospitals to provide
enough care to stabilize a person’s emergency condition50 and
thus falls short of even the most ungenerous conception of the
minimum benefits package. It does not, for example, cover
preventive care, primary care, prenatal care, care for chronic
conditions, follow-up care, or tertiary care (such as surgery or
invasive diagnostic tests) that are not necessary to stabilize the
patient’s emergency medical condition. However, for the
uninsured, the right to emergency medical care is the only right
to health care universally available, which may, in part,
explain why care is increasingly sought in emergency rooms in
the United States.51 Unlike the federal benefit programs,
EMTALA does not create a government-funded health care
program or state that all individuals have a right to emergency
medical care that the government will pay for or provide.
Instead, it requires that hospitals, as a condition of
participating in Medicare, provide emergency care in a
nondiscriminatory manner to all who present at their

uniformed services are also covered under TRICARE, but the statutory
language granting them access is weaker, requiring that the Secretary of
Defense to contract with managed care or other health plans to provide
medical and dental services for military members’ dependents, but only to the
extent that the Secretary considers appropriate. 10 U.S.C. § 1079(a).
49. Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd. An
“emergency medical condition” is defined as:
[A] medical condition manifesting itself by acute symptoms of
sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence of
immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in
(i) placing the health of the individual (or, with respect to a pregnant
woman, the health of the woman or her unborn child) in serious
jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious
dysfunction of any bodily organ or part . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1)(A).
50. Id. § 1395dd(b)–(c) (2006).
51. See Menzel, supra note 18, at 84; Stephen R. Pitts et al., Where
Americans Get Acute Care: Increasingly, It’s Not at Their Doctor’s Office, 29
HEALTH AFF. 1620,1624–25 (2010).
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emergency room.52
C. THE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT
This patchwork of federal programs discussed above
provides a statutory right to health care for certain subgroups
of the population. These programs, however, leave uncovered
approximately 43 million uninsured working-age adults and 7.5
million uninsured children.53 Congress responded to this
growing population of uninsured by creating a health insurance
coverage scheme to accomplish near-universal coverage for
those without health insurance. The ACA contains several
provisions that, when considered together, create a statutory
right to health care for the population not eligible for an
existing federal benefit program nor covered through employersponsored or other private insurance.54 However, an
affirmative statement that all Americans have a right to health
care is nowhere to be found in the ACA.
The right to health care under the ACA is different than
the other federal statutory rights because it does not create a
government program to provide health care or health
insurance. Other than a significant (now optional) expansion of
Medicaid,55 Congress declined to structure the right to health

52. Emergency Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.
53. Insurance Coverage Status, supra note 42.
54. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
55. The right to health care accomplished through expansion of Medicaid
to nearly all persons up 133% of the federal poverty level was originally
estimated to account for about half of the 32 million of those of those to be
newly insured under the ACA. The other half are covered through the right to
health care accomplished through the private insurance reform provisions
discussed in this Part I. After the Supreme Court ruled that the expansion
must be optional to states to be constitutional, it is unclear how many of the
states will opt-out of the expansion, leaving much of their population of poor
uninsured. Following the ruling, the Congressional Budget Office estimated
that 6 million fewer individuals will be covered by Medicaid because their
states opt out of the expansion. Of those, 3 million will obtain coverage
through the Exchanges, leaving a net of 3 million additional uninsured as a
result of the Supreme Court’s decision. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES
FOR THE INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
UPDATED FOR THE RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISION (2012), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012CoverageEstimates.pdf; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–
393, slip op. (U.S. June 28, 2012); Letter from Peter Elmendorf, Director,
Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
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care in the ACA through governmental provision of health care
or health insurance when the so-called “public option” was
defeated in earlier versions of the bill.56 Thus, unlike the
statutory language establishing an entitlement to health care
or health insurance under Medicare, Medicaid, or other federal
programs, the right to health care in the ACA is derived from a
combination of nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue
provisions applicable to private health insurers and the
creation of an accessible private health insurance market. The
choice to structure the right this way had the political
advantage of expanding existing private markets, and it relies
on competing private actors and the states to administer health
care coverage in a meaningful and cost-effective manner.
The health insurance nondiscrimination portions of the
right to health care are designed to prohibit health plans from
engaging in practices that have previously barred individuals
from obtaining coverage, such as denying coverage for
preexisting health conditions or prior medical history, charging
higher premiums based on gender or age, or finding technical
reason to rescind coverage when a person develops a health
condition.57 Health insurance companies employ these
(Mar. 18, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/
attachments/hr4872_0.pdf [hereinafter, CBO Estimate]; John V. Jacobi,
Sidney D. Watson & Robert Restuccia, Implementing Health Reform at the
State Level: Access and Care for Vulnerable Populations. 39 J.L. MED. ETHICS
(special supplement) 69, 69 (2011).
56. Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong.
(2009) (enacted); see also Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Battle Over
Two Public Insurance Proposals and Reject Both, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009,
at A18.
57. H.R. 3962 §§ 1001, 1201 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2006)) (going
into effect January 1, 2014 and prohibiting health plans in the group and
individual markets from: (1) excluding persons from coverage on the basis of a
preexisting condition; (2) setting eligibility rules based on health status,
medical condition, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history,
genetic information, evidence of insurability, disability or other health statusrelated factors determined by the Secretary of the Department of HHS; (3)
engaging in discriminatory premium pricing; and, (4) except for individual
health plans, imposing waiting periods for coverage in excess of ninety days).
See S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 3–4 (2009) (“For the millions of Americans who
don’t have employer-sponsored coverage, cannot afford to purchase coverage
on their own, or who are denied coverage by health insurance companies due
to a pre-existing condition, the [bill] reforms the individual and small-group
markets, making health coverage affordable and accessible. These market
reforms would require insurance companies to issue coverage to all individuals
regardless of health status, prohibit insurers from limiting coverage based on
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underwriting practices to avoid higher-risk and higher-cost
beneficiaries.58 As a result, an individual with an existing
health condition or unfavorable medical history may find she is
unable to qualify for a health insurance policy or one that is
affordable.59 Or she may lose coverage for medical expenses if
she hits an annual or lifetime cost-limit imposed by the plan or
find herself terminated from coverage following the
development of a high-cost condition, such as breast cancer.60
In addition, the ACA’s guaranteed issue provisions require
health plans to accept every employer or individual in the state
that applies for coverage and offer the essential benefits
package, so all persons will have access to basic, comprehensive
health insurance.61
The ACA’s nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue
provisions remove blockades to accessing health insurance by
forcing health plans to accept all prospective consumers and
engage in fair pricing and underwriting practices regardless of
health status, gender, or genetic predisposition. Removing
roadblocks only establishes part of the right to health care. The
right would remain relatively empty without affordable health
insurance products available to those for whom coverage was
pre-existing conditions and allow only limited variation in premium rates.”).
58. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–393, slip op. at 9–10
(U.S. June 28, 2012) (Ginburg, J., dissenting) (“Because individuals with
preexisting medical conditions cost insurance companies significantly more
than those without such conditions, insurers routinely refused to insure these
individuals, charged them substantially higher premiums, or offered only
limited coverage that did not include the preexisting illness.”); SUSAN JAFFE,
HEALTH AFF., HEALTH INSURANCE REFORMS: SHOULD THERE BE A NEW
FEDERAL LAW AND REGULATIONS TO BROADEN COVERAGE AND MAKE THE
MARKET WORK BETTER FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL BUSINESSES? (2009),
available
at
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/
healthpolicybrief_12.pdf.
59. See, e.g., David Hilzenrath, Acne, Pregnancy Among Disqualifying
Conditions, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 2009, at A3.
60. Christopher Lee, More Hitting Cost Limit on Health Benefits:
Consumers Forced To Explore Options, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2008, at A3;
Murray Waas, WellPoint Routinely Targets Breast Cancer Patients, REUTERS
(Apr. 23, 2010, 7:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/23/uswellpoint-breastcancer-idUSTRE63M5D420100423.
61. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1201, 124 Stat. 119, 183–84 (2010). Section 1201 also imposes affirmative
requirements on individual and group health plans to accept every employer
or individual in the state that applies for coverage; guarantee renewability of
coverage in the individual and group markets (other than self-insured group
plans); for all small group and individual plans, provide the essential benefits
package; and, for all group plans, meet cost-sharing limits requirements.
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previously beyond reach. This accessible health insurance
market is achieved through the creation of state-based health
insurance exchanges (Exchanges) and through subsidies for
those unable to afford coverage.62 Health insurance exchanges
are state-based marketplaces for “qualified health plans” that
offer the essential benefits package and meet affordability and
consumer
protection
requirements
(including
the
nondiscrimination and guaranteed issue requirements) for
qualified individuals and employers to compare information
and purchase health insurance.63 For those who cannot afford
to purchase health insurance from the Exchange but make too
much income to qualify for Medicaid, the ACA offers individual
subsidies for those earning up to 400 percent of the federal
poverty level.64
The role premium subsidies play in actualizing the right to
health care is highlighted by a strange outcome of the Supreme
Court’s ACA decision. The decision creates a hole in the right to
health care for those persons who would have been newly
eligible for Medicaid under the expanded program, but whose
state declines to pursue the ACA’s Medicaid expansion.
Pursuant to the Court’s ruling, states may opt out of the
Medicaid expansion to cover all non-retired persons up to 133%
of the federal poverty level without forfeiting the federal dollars

62. Id. § 1311 (creating health insurance exchanges) and § 1401
(providing for premium subsidies for individuals to purchase health
insurance).
63. Id. § 1311–12. A “qualified individual” is defined as an individual who
(1) is seeking to enroll in a qualified health plan in the individual market
offered through the Exchange, (2) is a citizen or lawful resident of the United
States, and (3) resides in the state that established the Exchange (other than
incarcerated individuals). Qualified employers initially include only small
employers with fewer than 100 employees that elect to offer Exchange-based
qualified health plans to full time employees, but expand to large employers
after 2017. Id.
64. Id. § 1401, amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001 [hereinafter HCERA]. The sliding-scale
subsidies take the form of refundable tax credits for premium costs and limits
to cost-sharing amounts and are designed to limit an individual’s out-of-pocket
expenses to affordable levels, ranging from 2 percent for individuals with
income up to 133 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL) to 9.5 percent for
those at 400 percent of FPL. See S. REP. NO. 111-89, at 4 (2009) (“To ensure
that health coverage is affordable, the [bill] would provide an advanceable,
refundable tax credit for low and middle-income individuals (between 100–400
percent of FPL) to help offset the cost of private health insurance premiums”).
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that help fund the state’s existing Medicaid program.65 If,
however, a state opts-out of Medicaid, no premium subsidies
would be available for those who are not eligible for Medicaid,
such as childless adults, and who earn less than 100% of the
federal poverty level, almost ensuring that these individuals
would be left uninsured.66
To the extent that remedies are intrinsic to the existence of
a right, the ACA’s right to health care, specifically the
nondiscrimination provisions applicable to insurance plans are
enforceable by individuals through federal regulations setting
forth requirements for appeals of adverse health plan decisions
and actions.67 If a health plan fails to meet the federal
requirements for the appeals process, the claimant may
immediately seek judicial review.68 What is less apparent is
whether individuals seeking to purchase a health plan on the
Exchanges have a remedy if their state does properly
administer an Exchange or if no affordable health plans are
offered in the Exchange. Such individuals, if they fall under
400% of the federal poverty limit, may be protected to some
degree by availability of the subsidies to make purchase of
health plans affordable.69
The closest the ACA comes to affirmatively recognizing a
right to health care is set forth in section 1312 of the ACA,
which provides, “A qualified individual may enroll in any
qualified health plan available to such individual and for which
such individual is eligible.”70 On its face, this right appears to
be limited by health plan availability and individual eligibility.

65. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–393, slip op. at 50
(U.S. June 28, 2012).
66. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, What Happens if a State Opts Out of Medicaid,
In One Chart, WASH. POST WONK BLOG (July 5, 2012, 10:25 AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/07/05/what-happensif-a-state-opts-out-of-medicaid-in-one-chart/.
67. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213-20 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1001; Interim Final Rules
for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Internal
Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43330, 43334 (July 23, 2010)
(to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 54 and 602, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147).
68. Id.
69. See supra note 64.
70. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
1312, 124 Stat. 119, 182–84, amended by § 10104(i)(I).
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The modifier “for which such individual is eligible” does not
appear to create additional limitations because qualified
individuals are, by definition, “qualified” and thus eligible to
purchase health insurance made available in their own state
Exchange.71 Qualified health plans must issue health insurance
policies to any individual in the state who applies. Thus, a
qualified individual arguably has a statutory right to obtain
health insurance from a qualified health plan in their state
Exchange. The availability of health plans may, however, pose
a limitation. Health insurers are not required to offer qualified
health plans in the Exchanges. It is assumed that health
insurers will want to participate in this new market, which
largely replaces and expands the individual and small group
insurance markets currently in existence. There is, however, no
guarantee that sufficient options will be offered by health plans
in the Exchanges.
Taken together, these health insurance reforms create a
negative right to health care—the right to be free from
discrimination on the basis of health status when seeking
coverage. The ACA’s right to health care is available for most,
but not all, of the uninsured72 by providing non-excludable
access to all individuals who seek to purchase health insurance,
creating a market for these health insurance products, and
subsidizing the costs of premiums for those who cannot afford
coverage. Unlike the Medicare, VA or TRICARE programs, the
federal government is not in charge of financing or
administering the health care services to which eligible persons
are entitled. The right is instead more akin to the right to
emergency care under EMTALA, creating an affirmative
obligation for private actors to provide coverage or care to all
who need services. As with EMTALA, when government is not
itself paying for or providing the health care, the right to health
71. See supra note 63 for the definition of a “qualified individual”.
72. The uninsured are those who are not covered by existing federal
health care programs, employer-based or other private health insurance. Note,
however, certain uninsured persons are left out of the ACA’s right to health
care: illegal immigrants are not eligible for Medicaid or premium subsidies for
the purchase of private insurance through the Exchanges. After the Supreme
Court’s decision, poor adults and others who make less than 100% of the
federal poverty level will not be eligible for premium subsidies because
Congress believed they would be covered by the expanded Medicaid program.
Such individuals in states that opt out of the Medicaid expansion will continue
to be uninsured.
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care is structured in terms of imposing obligations on private
entities to accept all comers.
II. DURABILITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
The ACA follows a line of statutes providing health care
coverage to an increasing proportion of the population. In
addition to health care benefits for the aged, disabled, certain
poor, members of the military, and veterans, the question
remains whether Americans will similarly embrace extending
such a right to the uninsured. The problem with the ACA’s
right to health care for the uninsured is that it is structured in
a way that weakens its prospects for durability. This part
explores what makes a right durable, drawing on and
expanding upon the sub-constitutionalism literature and theory
of superstatutes to add a new category called “quasisuperstatutes” to capture those that aspire to be, but fail to
achieve the entrenchment and social change required to become
a superstatute.
A. USING SUPERSTATUTES TO CREATE DURABLE STATUTORY
RIGHTS
Durable rights are rights that the public accepts as
fundamental legal norms for society and thus persist over time
without deterioration. Their widespread acceptance by the
public makes them resistant to erosion or political attack when
honoring the right is difficult, such as in challenging economic
circumstances or when the right is applied to an unpopular
group. A quintessential example of a durable right is the right
to freedom of speech. The right is accepted as a fundamental
norm for society’s functioning, so the right remains protected
even when the speech involves deeply offensive and unpopular
speech.73 This type of entrenchment makes a right durable and
allows individuals to be able to count on the protection of and
benefits of the right over time. Although constitutional rights
are the traditional examples of durable rights, entrenched
through the difficult Article V amendment process and
constitutional supremacy, many of the positive rights in this
country are created via statute rather than the Constitution.
73. See e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1218–19 (2011) (upholding
the First Amendment right of members of the Westboro Baptist Church to
protest at military funerals).
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According to a growing body of literature that can be
referred to collectively as “sub-constitutionalism,” it is
unsurprising that the right to health care in this country would
be accomplished via statute rather than through the
Constitution. According to this account, many of the laws that
create important legal norms in this country exist largely
outside the four corners of the Constitution.74 Rather, many of
the functions usually thought to be of a “constitutional” nature,
specifically the establishment of individual rights and
governmental institutions, are accomplished through subconstitutional laws.75 The inflexibility and structural
limitations of the Constitution drive Americans to utilize
statutes to articulate and protect most of the positive rights
that are guaranteed by law.76
The problem with statutory rights is that they do not
automatically come with the political protection and structural
entrenchment that endow constitutional rights. Even if
legislators muster the political will to create a new right, more
is required to make it durable. Here, the sub-constitutional
theory of superstatutes is useful because the same features

74. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8; Bruce Ackerman, The Living
Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1741 (2007); Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 410 (2007); Eskridge
& Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1215; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an
Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1934); see also, Preis, supra note 35.
75. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 1, 7 (“Some of the nation’s
entrenched governance structures and normative commitments are derived
directly from the Constitution, but most are found in superstatutes enacted by
Congress, executive-legislative partnerships, and consensus of state
legislature.”); Young, supra note 74, at 416 (citing society’s commitments to
environmental stewardship, intergenerational responsibility, and free market
economy as embodied by statutes such the Clean Water Act, Social Security
and Medicare regimes, and the Sherman Antitrust Act, rather than the
Constitution); see also Preis, supra note 35, at 1663 (arguing that enforcement
of constitutional norms often occurs by proxy through sub-constitutional
statutes that elaborate on constitutional guarantees).
76. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 25 (describing the
weaknesses of the Constitution that explain the rise of sub-constitutional law:
first, the Constitution is old and difficult to amend making it rigid and nonadaptive to changing norms and social problems; second, the Constitution’s
largely structural and process-orientation limits its ability to respond to the
substantive values and commitments important to the polity; third the
Constitution primarily addresses state actors and says little to nonpublic
sources of authority and power); Young, supra note 74, at 424 (“[M]any rights
that are fundamental for individuals in modern America are entirely creatures
of statute.”).
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that make a statute “super” will also make a statutory right
durable.
Statutory rights can be durable because they are contained
within entrenched superstatutes. According to Eskridge and
Ferejohn, a superstatute is a relatively rare breed of statute
that is similar to, and shares the work of, constitutions—by
articulating fundamental legal norms that become so embraced
by both public and institutional culture that they become
“deeply embedded in our national aspirations.”77 Examples of
superstatutes that have provided individual rights include: the
Social Security Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Voting
Rights Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.78
Three features distinguish superstatutes from ordinary
statutes.79 The statute: (1) embodies a new principle or policy
that displaces common law baselines and responds to
important social or economic challenges facing the country; (2)
is enacted after a process of publicized institutional
deliberation; and (3) sticks in the public culture, after a period
of implementation and formal confirmation by Congress after
further public discussion.80 The first two features of
superstatutes align with Bruce Ackerman’s concept of a
“constitutional moment,” which describes the particular
confluence of a strong social movement and public deliberation
to address a particular injustice or problem in a way that
establishes new fundamental legal norms.81 The involvement of
the public and the underlying effort to address social problems
give superstatutes weight and legitimacy beyond ordinary
statutes.82 Nevertheless, the third feature, entrenchment
through public support, is the most salient feature of

77. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1273. Cf. Ackerman, supra note
74, at 1742 (describing the role of “landmark statutes” such as the Social
Security Act in transforming constitutional norms).
78. See Ackerman, supra note 74, at 1742.
79. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 26.
80. Id.
81. Ackerman, supra note 74, at 1765.
82. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 27–28. Ordinary
statutes may become entrenched, but because they do not address an
important social problem or lack public deliberation, they do not express the
fundamental values of society the way superstatutes do. For example, statutes
like ERISA or certain provisions of the tax code may be entrenched through
institutional inertia and political capture by certain interest groups, but such
entrenchment alone, without the public engagement and normative objectives,
may not classify such statutes as superstatutes.
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superstatutes.
The type of entrenchment statutes achieve is a functional
entrenchment that occurs when a legal norm has widespread
popular support across an array of interests that makes it
resistant to political challenge.83 Unlike the “formal”
entrenchment process required by Article V of the Constitution,
where difficult procedural hurdles tie the hands of future
policymakers, popular support of superstatutes leads to
entrenchment through reaffirmation, continued expansion,
implementation, and refinement by subsequent legislatures,
executive agencies, and courts.84 To achieve the strong
constituency of support necessary for functional entrenchment,
implementation of the statute must overcome the challenges
predicted by the statute’s critics and deliver sufficient value to
a politically significant and growing group of the population.85
As a result, functionally entrenched statutory rights may be
just as important to Americans as certain formally entrenched
constitutional rights.86
One weakness of the superstatute theory is that the
application of the superstatute criteria does not predict at the
outset whether a particular statute will become a superstatute.
Thus, it is not certain whether the rights created by the statute
will ever become durable rights until the statute has stood the
test of time.87 Although this article does not purport to solve
this theoretical vacuum, it does assume that the optimal way to
forecast the fate of a would-be superstatute is to look to the
features of a statute that make it more or less likely to become
entrenched. These features of entrenchment include not only
the breadth of public support the statute has amassed upon
passage, but the ability of the statute to effectively deliver
tangible benefits to a wide swath of constituents while
garnering support from its opponents.88

83. See id. at 13; Young, supra note 74, at 458.
84. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1230–31.
85. A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 17.
86. See Young, supra note 74, at 412.
87. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1273 (“One test of a superstatute is that whatever the circumstances of its enactment, it instantiates a
principle that passes the test of time: it works, it appeals to multiple
generations, and it sticks in the public culture.”).
88. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 28.
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B. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S FRAGILE RIGHT TO HEALTH
CARE
The ACA is a statute that aspires to be a superstatute.
Nevertheless, the right to health care for the uninsured created
by the ACA is structured in a way that weakens its prospects
for durability. The ACA differs in significant ways from other
federal statutory rights to health care that have become
entrenched. The ACA’s right relies upon reformation and
creation of a private health insurance market for the uninsured
rather than a government-administered and funded program.
The ACA’s vulnerabilities are revealed when compared to
Medicare.
In the health care context, Medicare is a primary example
of a durable right created by a superstatute. Like most
superstatutes, Medicare addresses an important social
problem.89 Prior to its passage, most of the increasing
population of persons over age sixty-five lacked health
insurance and consequently were at risk for destitution,
increased infirmity, or even premature death.90 The New York
Times reported that by 1960 the question of medical insurance
for persons sixty-five years of age and older had become one of
the hottest political issues in the nation.91 The passage of
Medicare changed the existing baseline by extending federally
administered health care coverage to all persons over sixty-five
years of age.92 Similarly, the ACA addresses the pressing social
and economic problem that over fifty million nonelderly
Americans are uninsured.93 The push to cover these uninsured
and reform the health care system became the most pressing
political issue in the 2008 election.94 Nearly fifty years after
Congress created Medicare, the New York Times reported that
“five months after [President Obama’s] inauguration, health
care dominates the domestic agenda on both ends of
89. See id. at 26 (discussing how superstatutes address important social
or economic problems).
90. See SHERI I. DAVID, WITH DIGNITY, THE SEARCH FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID 5 (1985) (discussing a 1959 finding that only forty-three percent of
senior citizens had any hospital or health policy).
91. See Edwin L. Dale Jr., Congress Facing Issues Renewing Battle of
Budget, N.Y. TIMES, April 11, 1960, at 1.
92. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 197–98.
93. See KAISER COMMISSION, MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 1–2 (2012),
available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/1420-14.pdf.
94. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., HEALTH CARE AND THE 2008 ELECTIONS 1–4
(2008), available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7813.pdf.
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Pennsylvania Avenue.”95
Moreover, the legislation establishing Medicare followed a
period of extensive public and political deliberation. In the five
years prior to Medicare’s passage in 1965, both Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson had repeatedly championed several of
Medicare’s unsuccessful predecessors.96 Efforts to provide
health care coverage for the elderly date back even earlier, to
the origins of the Social Security Act itself.97 As with the
problem of covering the elderly that led to the passage of
Medicare, public debate over health reform and the problem of
the uninsured has persisted for decades.98 Several
administrations and Congresses have tried unsuccessfully to
extend coverage to the uninsured and reign in health care
costs.99 The most recent attempt, President Clinton’s Health
Security Act, would have accomplished near-universal coverage
through a combination of individual and employer mandates,
“managed competition” between health plans, and increased
government regulation.100
A significant difference between the ACA and Medicare,
however, is the degree of public support critical for
entrenchment and durability. The ACA’s capacity to attract
public support differs not only when measured at the time of
passage, but more importantly, in the way the right to health
care is structured to attract widespread support and overcome
its opponents in the critical period following passage. The
ACA’s right has several vulnerabilities that may prevent its
right to health care from garnering broad public support.101 The
vulnerabilities stem from the structure of the ACA’s right to

95. Kevin Sack, Health Care Reform’s Moment Arrives (Again), N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2009, at A17.
96. See DAVID, supra note 90, at 121; LAWRENCE R. JACOBS, THE HEALTH
OF NATIONS: PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN AND BRITISH
HEALTH POLICY 190 (1993).
97. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 197.
98. See Lee Igel, The History of Health Care as a Campaign Issue,
PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE J. MED. MGMT., June 12, 2008, at 12.
99. See id. at 14 (discussing health care attempts under the Nixon
administration).
100. Cf. Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993).
101. See, e.g., Ramesh Ponnuru, The Flaws that Will Bring Down Obama’s
Health Care Plan, BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 1, 2012, 5:30 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-01/the-flaws-that-will-bring-downobama-s-health-care-plan.html.
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health care, not as a publicly administered benefit program,
but rather, from private health insurance market reforms. The
ACA’s challenges fall into three related categories: (1) political
challenges; (2) legal challenges; and (3) market challenges.
1. Political Challenges
Significant political challenges to major social reforms are
not unique. Most superstatutes, including Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act and Medicare, faced significant political opposition
in their early years after passage.102 But public opinion often
drives political opinion, so that if a law does not provide enough
of a tangible benefit before the next election, political
opposition to new legislation or its implementation may not be
checked by rising public support.
Public support leading up to and following the passage of
Medicare appears to have been strong.103 Although Medicare
initially had strong opponents, namely in the American
Medical Association, opposition among the medical community
dwindled following Medicare’s passage.104 The medical
community’s opposition was tempered by significant regulatory
concessions in the form of generous increases in reimbursement
rates that led these opponents to see Medicare as a lucrative
source of new business.105 With the major bloc of opponents
disarmed, Medicare’s beneficiaries began enjoying its benefits
soon thereafter. Medicare was signed into law on July 31, 1965
and the program began paying for hospital insurance benefits
(Part A) on July 1, 1966 and nursing home and physicians’

102. See DAVID, supra note 90, at 11–12 (describing political opposition to
Medicare); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political
Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act
and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1452–54 (2003) (describing
opposition to the expansion of federal civil rights among a large group of
legislators from the South); see also ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL
SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1964 153–224, 287–314 (1990).
103. See Julie Ray, The Gallup Brain: Medicare’s Early Days, GALLUP
(May 27, 2003), http://www.gallup.com/poll/8491/gallup-brain-medicares-earlydays.aspx (finding that in 1964, sixty-one percent of Americans approved of
Medicare, thirty-one percent disapproved and eight percent did not know); see
also Andrew Kohut, Would Americans Welcome Medicare if it Were Being
Proposed in 2009?, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Aug. 19, 2009),
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1317/would-americans-welcome-medicare-ifproposed-in-2009.
104. See DAVID, supra note 90, at 11–12.
105. See id. at 150–51.
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payments (Part B) on January 1, 1967.106 Because participation
in Part B is voluntary, the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare—the precursor to the Department of Health and
Human Services—engaged in an intensive advertising
campaign to explain the Part B program to seniors across the
country.107 The Department’s advertising campaign was a great
success and achieved enrollment of ninety-five percent of the
eligible seniors in Part B within a year of Medicare’s
passage.108 In subsequent years, both Democratic- and
Republican-controlled Congresses expanded Medicare to
include coverage for ambulatory surgery services, prescription
drugs, private managed care plans, and additional classes of
eligibility.109 Even as the baby boomer generation begins to
qualify for Medicare and strain Medicare’s fiscal viability,
Medicare remains politically strong, and elected officials from
both parties who seek to curtail the program do so at their
peril.110 Like Social Security, its parent program, Medicare has
become fixed in the public’s mind as an essential means to
assure economic and medical security in old age, to which
Americans feel entitled and value as a fundamental social good
for society.111
106. Id. at 144.
107. Id. at 146 (explaining that the department published approximately
twenty-million informational kits in twenty-two languages, delivered in some
areas by horse or dogsled).
108. Id.
109. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (creating Medicare
Part D which expanded coverage to prescription drugs); Balanced Budget Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4001, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (creating Medicare
Part C which expanded coverage to managed care); Social Security
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (expanding
eligibility to individuals under 65 with longterm disabilities and individuals
with endstage renal disease).
110. See Peter H. Schuck, The Golden Age of Aging and Its Discontents, 18
ELDER L.J. 25, 40 (2010) (“This political entrenchment and inertia are even
more pronounced today because both political parties, desperate for senior
votes, are competing to be perceived as the most stalwart and unequivocal
defenders of the current Medicare program.”); see also Raymond Hernandez,
Gaining Upset, Democrat Wins New York Seat, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at
A1 (providing as a recent example of the strength of Medicare’s persistent
political support the electoral upset of a GOP House candidate attributed to
Congressman Paul Ryan’s fiscal year 2012 budget plan to transform Medicare
from a comprehensive public benefit program to a private, fixed cost voucher
system).
111. See Young, supra note 74, at 424–25.
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By contrast, when the ACA passed, public opinion was
mixed.112 This reaction may be due, in part, to the persisting
confusion about the complex content of the ACA and its
potential impact on the public.113 Politically, the right to health
care under the ACA faces more formidable opposition than
Medicare. Although the ACA was backed by the American
Medical Association, not one Republican voted for the Act.114 In
this way, the ACA was perhaps more like the Civil Rights Act,
which passed amidst bitter partisan division.115 A year and a
half after passage, the already divided public support for the
ACA continued to wane as the percentage of individuals who
believed the ACA would make no difference for them
increased.116 The major opponents of the ACA may not be
swayed by an administrative compromise, such as the favorable
reimbursement rates that won the medical community’s
support for Medicare. The opponents of the ACA focused less on
the practicalities of its effect on their business or income, but
rather on a more fundamental opposition to a government
mandate for individual participation in the health care
market.117
Although millions stand to benefit from the ACA’s coverage
provisions, most of these provisions do not go into effect until
112. KAISER FAM. FOUND., KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL 4 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/upload/8285-F.pdf (finding that at the time of
passage, forty-six percent of the public had a favorable view, forty percent had
an unfavorable view, and fourteen percent did not know); Lydia Saad, By Slim
Margin Americans Support Healthcare Bill’s Passage, GALLUP (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126929/Slim-Margin-Americans-SupportHealthcare-Bill-Passage.aspx (finding that on the day after the ACA’s passage,
49% of national adults polled reported that the passage was a “good thing,”
40% reported it was a “bad thing,” and 11% did not know).
113. KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, supra note 112 (finding that fiftytwo percent of the public do not feel they have adequate information to
understand how the law will affect them).
114. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Democrats Rally to Obama’s
Call for Health Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A16.
115. Rep. James Clyburn (D-S.C.), in describing the ACA, said, “This is the
Civil Rights Act of the 21st century.” Id.
116. KAISER HEALTH TRACKING POLL, supra note 112 (finding that as of
March 2012, two years after passage, 40% of the public had a unfavorable
opinion, 41% percent had a favorable opinion, and 19% did not know, and the
percentage of individuals reporting that they do not have enough information
to understand the ACA’s personal impact was 59%, virtually unchanged from
fifty six percent in April 2010, immediately after the Act’s passage).
117. See, e.g., Rep. Lamar Smith, Why I Am Voting to Repeal the New
Health Care Law, FOX NEWS (Jan. 19, 2011), www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/
01/19/rep-lamar-smith-voting-repeal-new-health-care-law/.
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January 2014, nearly four years after the passage of the Act
and two years after the presidential and congressional elections
of 2012. Unlike the seniors who started receiving Medicare
benefits within a year of its passage, the uninsured persons
who stand to benefit most from the ACA’s right to health care
remain confused about its amalgam of benefits and
requirements more than a year after the ACA’s passage.118
Finally, Medicare was supported by seniors, a cohesive
political group, that had coalesced into a powerful identity
group following the passage of the Social Security Act and
under the leadership of the AARP.119 The uninsured, by
contrast, do not make up a similarly stable or organized
political force. Although an estimated eighteen million will gain
insurance through the private insurance reforms,120 the group
itself may be somewhat fluid as people move between employerbased coverage, coverage through the Exchanges, and coverage
through government programs such as Medicaid. Moreover,
Medicare’s positive entitlement as a valuable government
program is easy for its beneficiaries to understand and defend.
In contrast, the features of the ACA’s right to health care, such
as tax credit subsidies, underwriting reforms, and state-based
Exchanges, may appear to beneficiaries less like a tangible
benefit and more like an amorphous array of private insurance
market rules. The ACA’s negative right to health care may thus
fail to inspire the sort of identity-politics that can powerfully
advocate for the ACA’s continued survival.121
118. Drew Altman, Uninsured But Not Yet Informed, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Aug.
2011),
http://www.kff.org/pullingittogether/uninsured_informed_
altman.cfm (finding in August 2011 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll that 47% of
uninsured adults 18–64 believed that the health reform law will not make
much difference to them, fourteen percent believed it would hurt them, and
seven percent did not know).
119. See ANDREA CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR
POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE 14–64 (2003)
(outlining the development of senior citizens as a powerful voting
demographic).
120. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ESTIMATES FOR THE INSURANCE
COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT UPDATED FOR THE
RECENT
SUPREME
COURT
DECISION
(2012),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43472-07-24-2012CoverageEstimates.pdf.
121. See Lawrence R. Jacobs, America’s Critical Juncture: The Affordable
Care Act and Its Reverberations, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 625, 630 (2011)
(“[T]he ACA’s reliance on tax credits and decentralized mechanisms (such as
state administration of health insurance exchanges) may well diminish its
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2. Legal Challenges
Almost as soon as it was passed, legal challenges to the
ACA began. The foremost claim by challengers was that the socalled individual mandate provision is unconstitutional because
it exceeds Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce.122
The individual mandate requires nearly all individuals to
maintain minimum essential health insurance by 2014 or face
civil penalties.123 In June 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that
the individual mandate does exceed Congress’ powers under
the Commerce Clause, but it upheld the mandate as a valid
exercise of the taxing power.124
The Supreme Court’s decision upholding the individual
mandate preserves the right to health care deriving from
insurance reforms.125 Although the creation of health insurance
exchanges and health plan nondiscrimination provisions are
not explicitly linked to or statutorily conditioned upon the
individual mandate, they are economically intertwined.126
Without the mandate, those who do not wish to purchase
health insurance while healthy could wait until they needed
care to purchase insurance.127 Because of the guaranteed issue
political effects. Not all government programs are transparent—or generous—
enough to create citizen interest groups in favor of the programs. Today’s tax
exemptions for home mortgages and employer-sponsored health insurance, for
example, are not recognized as government programs. Similarly, while the
ACA makes health insurance more secure for all Americans, these protective
provisions may not be enough to register with everyday citizens as tangible
payoffs.”) (footnotes omitted).
122. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, A Noxious Commandment, N.Y. TIMES, (June
26, 2012, 11:39 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/13/afatal-blow-to-obamas-health-care-law/an-unconstitutional-commandment.
123. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-48, §
1501(b), 124 Stat 242–49 (2010)) amended by § 10106 (b) and Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152 § 1002 (discussing
exemptions from the mandate for religious objectors, individuals with incomes
below the tax filing threshold, individuals for whom premiums would exceed
eight percent of household income, and others).
124. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11–393, slip op. at 39 (U.S.
June 28, 2012) (“Our precedent demonstrates that Congress had the power to
impose the exaction of §5000A under the taxing power . . . .”).
125. See id. at 6.
126. See id. at 53 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(“The whole design of the Act is to balance the costs and benefits affecting
each set of regulated parties. Thus, individuals are required to obtain health
insurance . . . . States are expected to expand Medicaid eligibility and to create
regulated marketplaces called exchanges where individuals can purchase
insurance.”).
127. See id. at 11 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[I]ndividuals can wait until
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and nondiscrimination provisions, health plans cannot deny
coverage or charge more to those who wait until they become
sick to purchase health insurance.128 Such adverse selection
would concentrate unhealthy, high-risk, and high-cost
individuals in the health insurance exchanges, making the
exchanges increasingly economically untenable to maintain.129
Health plans would need to raise premiums to cover this sicker
and riskier population without healthier persons to offset the
costs of coverage.130 The higher premiums would cause more
individuals to forego insurance and further concentrate sicker
and riskier persons in the insurance pool: the insurance “death
spiral.”131 As with all group insurance models, the low-utilizers’
inclusion in the insurance pool is necessary to subsidize the
high-cost members.132 Given a broad enough pool, the risk to
the insurer becomes more predictable and manageable.133
During the two-year period that legal challenges to the
ACA wound their way to the Supreme Court, there was a great
deal of uncertainty among health insurance providers and
states.134 These same actors must mobilize significant resources
to implement the new health insurance market created by the
ACA’s reforms. As of the day the Supreme Court’s decision was
announced, the prediction markets had the odds of the Court
striking down the individual mandate at about seventy-five
percent.135 Even following the Court’s decision resolving the
constitutional question, opponents continued to seek political

they become ill to buy insurance.”).
128. See id. at 17 (“Congress . . . acted reasonably in requiring uninsured
individuals, whether sick or healthy, either to obtain insurance or to pay the
specified penalty.”).
129. See id. at 11 (“This ‘adverse selection’ problem leaves insurers with
two choices: They can . . . raise premiums dramatically to cover their everincreasing costs or they can exit the market.”).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 33.
132. See id.
133. Cf. Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration of Health
Care Expenditures Revisited, 20 HEALTH AFF. 9, 11 (2001).
134. Cf. Bob McConnell & Fred Upton, Obama Care’s Uncertainty Cripples
States and Providers, INVESTORS.COM (Oct. 17, 2012, 6:49 PM),
http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials-on-the-right/101712-629730obamacare-implementation-produces-unanswered-questions.htm?p=full.
135. See The U.S. Supreme Court to Rule the Individual Mandate
http://www.intrade.com/v4/markets/contract/
Unconstitutional,
INTRADE,
?contractId=745353 (last visited Oct. 21, 2012).
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overturn of the ACA.136 The legal challenge to the individual
mandate, which economically undergirds the Act’s right to
health care, created so much uncertainty that many states
delayed taking legislative or administrative action to organize
Exchanges.137 Insurance companies had been hedging their
bets, both proceeding with implementation and bracing
themselves for the possibility of rampant adverse selection,
death spirals and state-shopping. Some postulated that without
a federal mandate, health insurers would exit the market in
states that did not impose a state-based mandate.138
The legal uncertainty over the ACA’s health insurance
reforms not only affected the parties required to implement the
health insurance reforms, but it also undermined public
confidence in the validity and durability of the right to health
care. The legal challengers framed the discourse about the ACA
as an infringement on individual rights, the right to be free
from coerced purchase of unwanted health insurance
products.139 This libertarian conceptualization of the individual
mandate appears to have gained more traction in the public’s
mind than the communitarian and more conceptually complex
relationship between the mandate and the popular
nondiscrimination provisions that make up the right to health
care.
Although the ACA’s right to health care survived its
primary legal challenge, it was weakened by the uncertainty,
implementation delay, and disapproving public discourse that
proliferated while the legal issues were pending.
3. Market Challenges
The ACA’s right to health care depends upon the collective
action by many different independent actors to create a new
universal and affordable private health insurance market.140
136. See, e.g., Roxana Tiron, Boehner Says House to Seek Repeal of HealthCare Law, BLOOMBERG (June 19, 2012, 11:24 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2012-06-19/boehner-says-house-to-seek-repeal-of-health-care-law.html.
137. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/stateactions-to-implement-the-health-benefit-exch.aspx (last updated Oct. 2012).
138. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No.11-393, slip op. at 11 (U.S.
June 28, 2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
139. Cf. Abigail Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209,
2213 (2011).
140. Sebelius, No. 11-383, slip op. at 53 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“[T]he Act attempts to achieve near-universal health
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Health insurance companies are not only required to comply
with
the
nondiscrimination
and
guaranteed
issue
requirements, but they also must be willing to offer products in
the Exchanges.141 The biggest market challenge to the success
and sustainability of this new insurance market is ensuring the
plans offered through the Exchanges are affordable.142 The
plans offered within the Exchanges must offer the essential
benefits package.143 To keep plans affordable, the Institute of
Medicine recommends the essential benefits be structured after
a typical small group plan rather than more expensive and
generous large group plan coverage.144 Moreover, despite the
ACA’s nondiscrimination and community rating requirements,
health plans will still have an incentive to try to attract
healthier persons to minimize their insurance risk, and
individuals will not necessarily aggregate evenly by their own
degree of risk within the options offered.145 Some degree of risk
selection will still persist within the Exchanges where
premiums will not reflect the actual risk posed by those with
insurance, which can destabilize the insurance market within
the Exchanges.146
In addition to the cooperation of health insurance firms,
the states must administer the Exchanges; ideally, they
function as a transparent and competitive market.147 The
insurance coverage by spreading its costs to individuals, insurers,
governments, hospitals, and employers . . . .”).
141. Cf. id. at 60 (“In the absence of federal subsidies to purchasers,
insurance companies will have little incentive to sell insurance on the
exchanges.”).
142. See id. at 59–60 (discussing how federal subsidies are necessary to
keep plans offered on the exchanges both available and affordable).
143. Id. at 45–46 (majority opinion) (“The Act also establishes a new
‘essential health benefits’ package, which States must provide to all new
Medicaid recipients—a level sufficient to satisfy a recipient’s obligations under
the individual mandate.”).
144. See INST. OF MED., supra note 20, at 6–7 (“[T]he committee endorses
. . . using as the cost target the estimated national average premium that
would have been paid by small employers in 2014 . . . .”); see also Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148, § 1302, 124 Stat 163,
163–68 (2010).
145. See Jonathan P. Weiner et al., Adjusting for Risk Selection in State
Health Insurance Exchanges Will Be Critically Important and Feasible, But
Not Easy, 31 HEALTH AFF. 306, 306–09 (2012).
146. Cf. id. at 310.
147. Cf. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 52 (U.S. June 28, 2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“States are expected to . . .
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states play key roles in gathering price and quality data from
participating health plans to give consumers enough
information to make informed purchasing choices.148 The
Exchanges are also responsible for providing information to the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) regarding
whether individuals are qualified for tax credit subsidies or
whether their employer-offered coverage meets affordability
requirements.149 Some states, however, have refused to begin
implementing the Exchanges due to political opposition or
uncertainty pending the outcome of legal challenges to the
ACA.150
The ACA’s right to health care relies upon market
competition, an increase in the pool of those with insurance and
several other indirect mechanisms to keep premium prices for
health insurance offered in the Exchanges under control.151
The removal of a government-offered “public option” health
plan from the final bill eliminated an additional tool to foster
competition and exert downward pressure on prices in the
Exchanges.152 With Medicare, by contrast, the government is
the payer and can set its prices and implement payment and
health care delivery reforms to try to keep its costs down.153
create regulated marketplaces where individuals can purchase insurance.”).
148. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-48
§ 1311, 124 Stat. 119, 173–81 (2010).
149. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1411.
150. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, supra
note 137 (reporting that as of October 2012, 17 states have not undertaken
legislative efforts to begin implementation of Exchanges); Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act § 1321 (establishing that if states or regions do not
implement the Exchanges by their implementation deadline, the federal
government will operate the Exchange).
151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 9001, amended
by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1401, 124 Stat. 1029 (showing taxes on high-cost “Cadillac” plans as a
mechanism to keep insurance premiums low). Another mechanism to keep
insurance premiums low is to tax medical loss ratios. Id. §§ 9010, 10050.
152. See Pear & Calmes, supra note 56, at A18.
153. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 3022
(establishing the Medicare Shared Savings Program for the formation of
accountable care organizations); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 § 3023 (establishing a pilot program on payment bundling); Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 3001 (establishing value-based
purchasing for hospitals); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
§ 3025 (discussing provisions to cut Medicare payments by eliminating
payments for excess hospital readmissions); Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act of 2010 § 2702 (stopping payments for hospital-acquired conditions);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3401, amended by Health Care
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The authors of the ACA believed a right to health care for
the uninsured could be made accessible and affordable through
market forces and competition. The reliance on the private
market may have been politically necessary, but this strategy
depends on a myriad of potentially reluctant actors coming
together to create a viable insurance market where one has not
previously succeeded.
C. QUASI-SUPERSTATUTES
The literature on subconstitutionalism presents the
concept of superstatutes as a binary question: a piece of
legislation either is or is not a superstatute.154 The discussion
of subconstitutionalism would benefit from further refinement
to include a third category of “quasi-superstatutes.” These
quasi-superstatutes are statutes that have the ambition of
addressing an important social problem and undergo serious
public deliberation (two qualities of superstatutes), but fail to
achieve the entrenchment necessary to deliver their promised
solution.155 These statutes are quasi-superstatutes because the
rights or new legal norms they create are not fully accepted by
the public, either because the public support is lacking or
because not enough of the public experiences the benefits of the
new right or legal norm to create functional entrenchment
before it is rolled back by courts or future Congresses. The
apparent fragility of the ACA’s central aim, to create a right to
health care for the uninsured, makes it more likely that the
ACA will be a quasi-superstatute than a superstatute.
One example of a quasi-superstatute is the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).156 When it passed, the ADA was
heralded as an “emancipation proclamation” for the disabled.157
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1105, 124
Stat. 1029 (discussing reduction in the Part A “market basket” annual
increases); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1102
(discussing reduction in payments under Medicare Advantage).
154. See A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES, supra note 8, at 26–28 (describing
attributes of superstatutes, but not mentioning the result or ability of only
partial satisfying superstatute criteria).
155. See id. at 26 (providing additional information on the three
overarching attributes of superstatutes).
156. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327.
157. See Edmund Newton, Disabled: The Battle Goes On, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
16, 1990, at E1 (describing the statute as “an ‘emancipation proclamation’ for
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The employment discrimination and accommodation provisions
were designed to dramatically increase access to and
maintenance of jobs for the disabled.158 To be sure, the ADA
has created significant benefits for the disabled, such as the
changes to the built environment requiring handicapaccessibility
to
public
buildings,
sidewalks,
and
transportation.159 But many agree the ADA fell short on its
initial promise of increasing employment among disabled
persons.160 The prevailing theory for why the ADA failed to live
up to its promise is the judiciary’s hostility to the ADA’s
employment protections.161 This reflects a general public
backlash against what were perceived as onerous
accommodation requirements for employers and a lack of public
support for the disabled. As of 2007, an estimated 97% of cases
brought to enforce the ADA’s employment provisions had been
decided in favor of employers,162 and employment rates among
the disabled declined or stayed flat in the first decade following
the ADA’s passage.163 With the ADA, the Supreme Court’s
43 million disabled Americans”); see also 136 Cong. Rec. 17,369 (1990)
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (displaying the language as attributed to Senator
Harkin); 135 Cong. Rec. 19,888 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (displaying
the language as attributed to Senator Kennedy).
158. Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why
the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not Care, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522 (2008).
159. See, e.g., id. at 553, 574.
160. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78 (2002)
(discussing whether or not an employee can be screened from employment
because of their disability and its relation to the employee’s safety); Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999) (discussing the word
“disability”); see also Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., “Substantially Limited”
Protection from Disability Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and
Misconstructions of the Definition of Disability, 42 VILL. L. REV. 409, 539–46
(1997); Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights
Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 22 (2000); Chai R. Feldblum,
Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 91, 139–60 (2000); Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default,
and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279, 1303–08 (2000); Michael
Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 579, 631–36 (2004); Rebecca Hanner
White, Deference and Disability Discrimination, 99 MICH. L. REV. 532, 537–39
(2000).
161. See Selmi, supra note 158, at 526–27.
162. Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I
- Survey Update, 31 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007).
163. See INST. OF MED. COMM. ON DISABILITY IN AM., THE FUTURE OF
DISABILITY IN AMERICA 454–56 (Marilyn J. Field & Alan M. Jette eds., 2007),
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narrow interpretations were a type of retrenchment. The
retrenchment was furthered when the political process failed to
correct the Court’s narrowing of the ADA’s protections. Indeed,
some have theorized the Court’s decisions were based on
perceptions of the public’s lack of support for broad mandates
for disability accommodations or Congressional ambivalence
when drafting the ADA.164
A statute becomes entrenched through the recursive
interpretation, implementation, expansion, and refinement by
courts, agencies, and future legislatures.165 Conversely, a
statute may become retrenched through narrowing judicial
interpretation, failures of enforcement or implementation by
agencies, and Congressional antipathy or apathy toward
statutory fixes, refinement, or expansion.166 The lack of public
support required to achieve the functional entrenchment
necessary to become a superstatute differentiates superstatutes
from their quasi-super counterparts. The narrow judicial
interpretations of the ADA’s provisions could be corrected by a
public push for Congressional action to restore and clarify the
ADA. Congress’s long silence on the issue may have signaled
that such public support was lacking.167 The ACA’s embattled
individual mandate is not susceptible to a simple legislative
fix.168 As discussed above, the ACA faced not only judicial
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK11434/pdf/TOC.pdf.
164. See Selmi, supra note 158 at 526–27.
165. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 1229–30.
166. Cf. id. at 1228.
167. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122
Stat. 3553 (showing in 2008 Congressional passage of the ADA Amendments
Act was eighteen years after the ADA’s initial passage); Jeannette Cox,
Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L.J.
187, 188 (2010) (discussing reversal of the courts’ narrow interpretation of the
term “disability,” which thus broadened the class of persons covered by the
ADA); see also, e.g., Stacy A. Hickox, The Underwhelming Impact of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 419,
421–22 (2011) (discussing that despite Congress’ effort to counter the
judiciary’s narrowing of the ADA, scholars are skeptical of the Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act’s impact on the employment prospects for
disabled individuals because Congress left unchanged the difficult standard
that a person must prove he or she is “substantially limited” in a major life
activity to be considered disabled under the Act.).
168. Options for the individual mandate include restructuring the mandate
as a voluntary incentive (such as a tax credit) to purchase health insurance
without a penalty, which may as a policy matter reduce the number of those
who become insured and increase the costs of coverage.
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challenges to its key individual mandate provision, but also
faces political and market challenges that could undermine the
public support for its guarantee of health care access to the
uninsured.169
Falling into the category of quasi-superstatutes does not
mean that a statute may never emerge as a superstatute. For
example, the 2008 amendments to the ADA overrode many of
the courts’ previous interpretations that narrowed the
definition of a “disability.”170 Although some believe the ADA
amendments did not go far enough, such Congressional action
could be the type of incremental legislative elaboration and
strengthening that eventually rescues the ADA from the quasisuperstatute category.171 Statutes and public opinion are not
fixed entities, and especially for statutes that have failed to
become functionally entrenched through broad public support,
legal and social norms can evolve with public opinion.
That a would-be superstatute could end up as a quasisuperstatute underscores the point that the way a new right or
legal norm is structured and implemented matters as much as
mustering the political will to get it passed in the first place.172
Congress, for example, has been accused of intentionally
leaving vague critical terms in the ADA, such that courts’
narrow interpretations of these terms were consistent with
Congress’s own ambivalence.173 Although Congress can amend,
expand, or refine a statute that fails to achieve its initial
promise, it is not always easy to garner the political will and
interest group coordination necessary for statutory fixes as

169. See supra Part II.B.
170. Compare Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 with Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008,
the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3555 (2009).
171. See Hickox, supra note 167, at 421–22.
172. See Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of
Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 704 (2011) (“[N]othing
about the process or pedigree of enactment guarantees the sustainability of
general-interest reforms. What matters, instead, is that the downstream
political process is structured in a way that gives residual as well as newly
created supporters of these reforms sufficient political power to fend off
attacks from opponents.”).
173. See Selmi, supra note 158, at 526–27 (arguing that despite the ADA’s
broad bipartisan support in Congress when passed, the ADA’s textual
vagueness on key provisions such as what constitutes a “disability” is evidence
that Congress itself was ambivalent about to whom and what extent its
protections should apply).
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coalitions may quickly dissipate following passage.174 Moreover,
it may be easier to gather public support for legislative
enhancement to a popular superstatute than for a quasisuperstatute that is marked by the stigma of disappointment
and ineffectiveness. A statute that fails to deliver benefits
quickly to a sufficient group may lack the sustained interestgroup advocacy necessary for a would-be superstatute to
become entrenched in the public’s mind. The cautionary tale of
quasi-superstatutedom can shed light on how a statute like the
ACA may move from its fragile start to become a superstatute
that guarantees a durable right to health care.
III. DEVELOPING A DURABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE
The apparent fragility of the ACA’s right to health care
contains lessons regarding strategic considerations for
developing a durable right to health care. Much of the
vulnerability of the right to health care is concentrated early in
the ACA’s lifespan, during the long time frame between its
passage and the delivery of its benefits. If it survives this
critical period, the right to health care could become
increasingly entrenched as interest groups emerge to defend
the right and political feedback strengthens the existing
arrangement relative to those who seek its repeal. This Part
first outlines a path for the ACA’s right to health care to
become a durable right and then discusses the lessons to be
gleaned from the ACA’s early vulnerabilities for the
development of a durable right to health care.
A. THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S PATH TO DURABILITY
The ACA’s fragile right to health care is most vulnerable in
its infancy. Its prospects of becoming a durable right depend on
its survival until the point that its benefits begin. Most of the
benefits of the ACA’s right to health care for the uninsured will
not begin to take effect until 2014, and they could require
several additional years to reach full implementation.175 Some

174. See Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L.
REV. 813, 828 (1998); Levinson, supra note 172, at 704.
175. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 55, at tbl.2 (showing that
initial CBO estimates of coverage for newly uninsured use a five-year timeline
(2014–2019) to estimate the total coverage effects of the ACA’s insurance
reforms and Medicaid expansion).
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benefits took effect soon after passage, including: provisions
allowing young adults under the age of twenty-six to remain on
their parents’ health insurance policies, prohibitions on denials
of coverage for children with preexisting conditions, and the
creation of temporary high-risk pools for adults with
preexisting conditions.176 But these benefits appear to have had
a negligible effect on broader public support of the Act, perhaps
because the benefits of these smaller programs do not outweigh
the larger political opposition to the individual mandate.177
Principles of behavioral economics explain how statutes and
regulations gain entrenchment through positive political
feedback: the reform can sow the seeds of its own political
support by endowing emerging interest groups with valuable
benefits.178
The endowment effect predicts that once established,
statutory or regulatory schemes have a stronger tendency
toward maintenance of the status quo over advocates for
change or retrenchment.179 The endowment effect describes the
phenomenon where individuals’ aversion to changes perceived
as a loss of existing benefits exceeds their motivation to obtain
the benefit in the first place.180 For example, a person who
bought a bottle of wine for $5 thirty years ago may refuse to
sell the wine to a wine merchant for $100 today, though he is
unwilling to spend $100 to purchase the same bottle of wine.181
In a statutory context, the advantage of the endowment effect’s
inertia against change only applies once the statute has been
176. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11148, § 1001, 124 Stat. 119, 130–131, amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, §§ 1004, 2301, 124 Stat. 1029,
1034–1036, 1081–1082 (expanding coverage for dependents up to age twentysix); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1201, amended by Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act § 2301 (prohibiting health plans from
excluding children under nineteen on the basis of preexisting condition);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1101 (creating temporary
highrisk pools for adults with preexisting conditions).
177. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112, at 8 (table showing lack of
increase in public support of the ACA).
178. See Levinson, supra note 172, at 687.
179. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97
NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1266–67 (2003).
180. See Cherie Metcalf, Introduction: Emerging Paradigms of
Rationality—Theory and Applications, 35 QUEEN’S L.J. 1, 12–14 (2009)
(providing additional information on the endowment effect). See generally
Richard H. Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORG. 39 (1980) (explaining endowment effect).
181. Thaler, supra note180, at 43.
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established—when all its institutions, benefits, and procedures
have been fully implemented.182 If the ACA’s right to health
care can survive the long and uncertain implementation phase,
the tens of millions of individuals, plus the health insurance
plans, employers, and providers who stand to benefit, could
create a strong constituency of support that may lead to its
entrenchment.
Whether or not they coalesce into a politically active
interest group, a diverse group of individuals and entities will
gain valuable benefits under the ACA’s reforms.183 For
example, groups of people who typically lack employersponsored health care, such as those who lose their jobs, work
for a small business, work part time, or retire early, would all
potentially benefit from the availability of affordable, nonexcludable health plans on the Exchanges and tax credit
subsidies to purchase health insurance.184 The problem with
these groups is that although they might account for millions of
individuals at any given time, people may move fluidly through
these different statuses of employment. Long-term membership
in this group of beneficiaries could be limited. More stable
groups of defenders may emerge, such as individuals with
preexisting medical conditions who lack large group or
government-provided coverage for long periods of time due to
inability to work. In addition, employers may increasingly
embrace the Exchanges as a cost-effective option to provide
health insurance to their employees.185 Though subject to
significant additional regulation, health insurance companies
could join the defenders of the ACA to keep the millions of new
customers who had previously remained outside the health
insurance market.186 Health care providers may also welcome
the influx of additional insured patients and concomitant
182. Korobkin, supra note 179, at 1266–67.
183. See Who Benefits from Health Care Ruling?, MSN MONEY (Jun. 28,
2012,
3:29
PM),
http://money.msn.com/health-and-life-insurance/
article.aspx?post=8c68398b-f0cf-48e5-8216-d29b2b4547cf.
184. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, THE
UNINSURED: A PRIMER—KEY FACTS ABOUT AMERICANS WITHOUT HEALTH
INSURANCE 2–7, 11–13 (2006).
185. Christine Eibner, Peter Hussey, and Federico Girosi, The Effects of the
Affordable Care Act on Workers’ Health Insurance Coverage, 363 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1393, 1393–65 (2010).
186. Robert I. Field, Regulation, Reform and the Creation of Free Market
Health Care, 32 HAMLINE J. PUB.L. & POL’Y 301, 324, 329 (2011).
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reductions in uninsured and unreimbursed care.187 Drug
manufacturers and others who will supply the medical needs of
the newly covered also stand to benefit.188 With the benefits of
health insurance coverage, new customers, or new patients, the
endowment effect predicts that the beneficiaries of the ACA’s
right to health care will have greater motivation (and thus
exert greater political pressure) to maintain these benefits than
opponents will have to repeal the law.189
The phenomenon of political entrenchment can be
compared to the economic notion of increasing returns, which
stems from the amplification of initial choices through path
dependence.190 A classic example of the phenomenon has been
observed in the persistence of the QWERTY keyboard layout
due to historical, seemingly insignificant accidents that gave
this layout an advantage in the market over other more
efficient layouts.191 In a more salient example, the complex
structure of health care coverage in the U.S. (split between
private, employment-based coverage for workers, governmentbased coverage for seniors, the poor, and the disabled, and
large coverage gaps of uninsured) has been attributed to
historical decisions by government and private firms to
subsidize employment-based health insurance and to remove
costly, difficult-to-insure populations from the private health
insurance market into government programs.192
The factors that explain the entrenchment of political
arrangements have been analogized to factors that lead to
increasing economic returns: (1) political arrangements that
have large setup costs increase incentives to maintain the
initial arrangement; (2) political institutions that are tailored
to the political arrangement increase the cost of change; and (3)

187. Id. at 324.
188. Reed Abelson, In Health Care Overhaul, Boons for Hospitals and Drug
Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at B1.
189. See Gillette, supra note 174, at 827; see also Louise Radnofsky, Repeal
Health Law? It Won’t Be Easy, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702036875045766551304862048
62.html (arguing that repealing “ObamaCare” will not be as easy as many
presidential candidates propose).
190. See Levinson, supra note 172, at 690.
191. See, e.g., Ron Martin & Peter Sunley, Path Dependence and Regional
Economic Evolution, 6 J. OF ECON. GEOG. 395, 399–400 (2006).
192. See Jacob S. Hacker, The Historical Logic of National Health
Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian,
and U.S. Medical Policy, 12 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 57, 107 (1998).
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political coordination by interest groups increase inertia and
stability in the status quo as more people rely upon and expect
to utilize the arrangement moving forward.193 As applied to the
ACA, the costs of passage in terms of political will and
coordination were large.194 In addition, the relative benefits of
the institutional arrangement settled upon by the ACA may be
magnified by comparison to the costs of returning to the preACA status where problems of uninsured and rising health
care costs were largely unaddressed.195 Once states, health
insurance providers, and other market players have sunk costs
into developing institutions like Exchanges under the ACA,
there will be a disincentive to dismantle these institutions in
favor of other models.196 The coordination effect of the coalition
of interest groups that could emerge to defend the ACA’s right
to health care may increase the political value of the ACA’s
benefits as more people come to count on them. Moreover, the
longer the ACA’s individual mandate and other reforms persist,
the less they may be perceived by opponents as infringements
on liberty or economic interests. People become accustomed to
existing legal and economic arrangements so that constraints,
such as the payment of payroll taxes to fund Medicare or the
obligation of all drivers to obtain auto insurance, are no longer
viewed as objectionable.197
Most of the public outrage at the ACA has focused on the
individual mandate, which appears to have driven the majority
of the opposition to the ACA generally.198 Once implemented,
opposition to the mandate may decline if the 83% of Americans
who already have coverage through their employer or a
193. Levinson, supra note 172, at 690.
194. David E. Sanger, For Historic Stakes, a Big Obama Gamble on a
Partisan Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A1.
195. See Levinson, supra note 172, at 684 (“[T]he greater the costs of
recoordinating on a different settlement, the more resilient we should expect
current institutional arrangements to be. Institutional arrangements that are
costly to set up and costly to do without will be protected by substantial
coordination buffers.”).
196. See id.
197. Id. at 691.
198. See Radnofsky, supra note 189 (citing a Kaiser Health Tracking Poll
finding 67% of those polled would repeal the individual mandate, but
significant majorities would keep other ACA provisions including tax credits
for small businesses to offer health coverage to employees (82%), prohibitions
on denials of coverage for preexisting conditions (73%), and tax-credit
subsidies for low income Americans to purchase coverage (72%)).

FUSE BROWN_PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/11/2013 11:40 AM

DURABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE

485

government program realize their own health care coverage
will remain relatively unaffected by the ACA.199 For many of
those previously uninsured who will have to purchase
insurance under the mandate, the sting of being forced to buy
health insurance may be lessened if their policy is subsidized
by tax credits, they are eligible for Medicaid under its expanded
eligibility criteria, or, as young adults, they may purchase lowcost, catastrophic policies to meet the requirement.200 Many
others, such as those with preexisting health conditions, will
purchase their health insurance gladly, happy to have access to
health coverage at all.
These models from behavioral economics tell us that the
opponents of the ACA, while formidable, are in a race against
the implementation of its benefits. If the ACA’s key provisions
survive to implementation, the endowment effect and
increasing political returns will begin to ossify and entrench
the ACA’s institutional structures and increase the durability
of its right to health care.
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DURABLE RIGHT
TO HEALTH CARE
The structure of the ACA’s right to health care for the
uninsured through private insurance reforms was driven by
political necessity.201 To gain enough votes to pass, the
legislation had to cover the uninsured through expansions in
the private health insurance market rather than solely through
government benefit programs.202 The ACA’s coverage structure
reflects the existing health care system’s coverage based on
private, employer-based health insurance and piecemeal
government coverage for subgroups, rather than an effort to
design the optimal system for universal coverage and

199. U.S. Health Insurance (Quartley), GALLUP-HEALTHWAYS WELL-BEING
INDEX,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/151190/health-insurance-quarterly.aspx
(last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (poll showing eighty-three percent of Americans
report having insurance coverage).
200. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 11148, § 1401, 124 Stat. 119, 213–20 (premium subsidies); Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 2001 (Medicaid expansion); Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1302 (catastrophic plans for young adults
under thirty).
201. See Arnold J. Rosoff, Of Stars and Proper Alignment: Scanning the
Heavens for the Future of Health Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2100, 2116–
17 (2011).
202. See id.
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administration of health care services.203 Absent a significant
turn of political will to upend the path-dependent system that
emerged from the early choices to link health care coverage to
employment, any effort to create a durable right to health care
will face similar political and practical challenges as the
ACA.204 There are, however, a few lessons to be drawn from the
challenges faced by the ACA for designers of health care
coverage strategies, including lessons about implementation
timeframes, complexity, uncertainty, and structure.
The largest lesson is that the timeframe for
implementation of the ACA’s right to health care is too long.
The four-year lag between the Act’s passage and most of its
reforms spans two elections and gives opponents time to
mobilize political challenges before the beneficiaries of the Act
begin to realize most of its benefits. Unlike the seniors who
gained Medicare benefits within a year of its passage, the
interest groups that coalesced around the ACA’s passage may
fracture and cool before public support emerges from the
delivery of popular benefits. The campaign to educate the
public about the ACA’s benefits is more difficult because the
benefits remain years away. Over time, the public, even those
who previously supported the Act, may start to doubt that they
will benefit under the provisions of the ACA.205
The long time frame for implementation of the health
insurance reforms may have been driven by the nature of the
private insurance market, whose financial models and
underwriting practices span years rather than months.206 In
addition, the time frame allows states time to organize the new
marketplaces for health insurance plans. States must
undertake initiatives to implement the Exchanges and create
new administrative bodies to oversee implementation, often
203. See id. at 2097–99 (discussing the historical origins and subsequent
entrenchment of the U.S. employer-based health insurance system).
204. See id. at 2100 (“We can imagine and argue for all types of health care
system models and configurations—single-payer governmental systems, mixed
public-private systems, employment-based private systems, managed
competition, and so on—but any debate must begin with what we presently
have.”).
205. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112, at 11 (suggesting that
supporters of the health reform law are beginning to lose confidence they will
ever actually benefit from the law).
206. See INST. OF MED., supra note 20, at 84 (tables demonstrating the fact
that financial modeling occurs over years).
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through separate state legislation.207 It is unclear whether the
four-year time frame for implementation was the shortest
period in which the coverage reforms could be implemented
realistically or whether it was agreed upon as a concession to
the health insurance industry and states to ease the burden of
implementation. When compared to Medicare’s single-payer
administration and one-year implementation, the decision to
distribute the responsibility for health care coverage reforms
among myriad private health insurers and the fifty states
might explain why the implementation is so lengthy under the
ACA. In this manner, the long time frame for realization of the
right to health care under the ACA points to another lesson for
designers of a right to health care: the role of complexity.
The complexity of the ACA generally, and the mechanics of
its right to health care specifically, may stand in the way of its
public support.208 Most of the public still does not understand
the main features of the right to health care under the ACA,
not to mention the interlocking nature of the nondiscrimination
provisions, health insurance Exchanges, tax credits and
subsidies, and the individual mandate.209 The case for opposing
the individual mandate (i.e., that government is forcing you to
purchase an expensive product you do not wish to buy) seems
easier for the public to understand intuitively than the idea
that the individual mandate is economically necessary to have
health insurance policies that do not discriminate on the basis
of preexisting conditions or health status.210 As pointed out
earlier, months or years after passage, the uninsured that
stand to benefit most directly still do not understand or believe
the ACA will help them.211 Complexity is a barrier to durability
when it makes implementation and selling the new law to the
public difficult.212

207. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, supra
note 137.
208. See Forrest Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and
the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 252, 257 (2008) (“Major laws that
are more complex are more likely to be amended.”).
209. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112, at 7 (showing public
confusion over the elements of the ACA).
210. See supra Part II.B.2.
211. See Altman, supra note 118.
212. Atul Gawande, Something Wicked This Way Comes, NEW YORKER
(June 28, 2012), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2012/06/
something-wicked-this-way-comes.html (arguing that the ACA’s attempt to
cover the uninsured addresses a “wicked problem” that is messy, ill-defined,
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A third lesson is that, to the extent possible, the right to
health care should not be built upon an uncertain legal
foundation.213 Although the individual mandate was upheld by
the Supreme Court in June 2012, the intervening twenty-seven
months while the legal challenges were pending spelled a
period of suspended animation for the implementation of many
of the law’s key provisions.214 The legal challenges to the
individual mandate undermined the right to health care by
introducing uncertainty to the implementation process.215
States have been wary of spending resources to assemble the
Exchanges.216 The insurance industry’s amicus brief to the
Supreme Court was an unvarnished plea for resolution of the
uncertainty as health plans prepared to come into compliance
with the ACA’s myriad health insurance reforms.217 Even those
individuals who understand the health insurance protections
scheduled to take effect in 2014 may not feel confident that
those benefits will survive legal or political challenge. The
result of this uncertainty is that stakeholders throughout the
system engaged in a kind of stutter-step, which prevented them
from sinking resources toward implementation.218 Without
sunk costs, the barriers to dismantling or abandoning the
ACA’s right to health care are reduced.219

and complex, and for such wicked problems, “[Generally,] reforms pursued
straight forward goals but required inherently complicated, difficult-to-explain
means of implementation”).
213. See Maltzman & Shipan, supra note 208, at 256–57.
214. See supra Part II.B.2.
215. See Brief for America’s Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in Partial
Support of Certiorari Review at 5–10, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius,
No. 11-393, slip op. (U.S. June 28, 2012).
216. See State Actions to Implement Health Insurance Exchanges, supra
note 137 (showing a large number of states have not implemented Exchanges).
217. Brief for America’s Health Ins. Plans as Amicus Curiae in Partial
Support of Certiorari Review, supra note 215, at 3 (“[Our] comprehensive
compliance efforts, however, are being conducted in a cloud of uncertainty
about the durability of the monumental changes being made and the legal
regime that will govern insurance plans going forward. Only a prompt and
definitive ruling by this Court on the individual mandate’s constitutionality
can restore needed certainty to the health care market.”).
218. See id. at 3, 5–10; Gillette, supra note 174, at 819 (“[N]o single party
will incur the costs of deviation from the existing standard without assurances
that offsetting benefits can be realized as a result of mass movement to the
new equilibrium.”).
219. See Martin & Sunley, supra note 191, at 412 (discussing inertia of
sunk costs).
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A final lesson is that the federal government’s options to
strengthen the federal right to health care have been
significantly hemmed in by the Roberts Court. One option is
that the federal government could follow explicitly the roadmap
set forth by the Court’s ruling on the ACA. If a right to health
care is going to be delivered in significant portion through a
private health insurance market, it will require something like
an individual mandate to avoid the adverse selection death
spiral. Such a mandate is beyond the power of a federal
government unless it is functionally structured as a tax.220 This
is a difficult political needle to thread—preserving the
centrality of a private health insurance system without
appearing to impermissibly compel individuals to purchase
health insurance on the one hand, or raise taxes to fund such
purchase on the other. Nor may Congress look to its spending
power to impose conditions to expand, alter, or strengthen the
right for those covered by large federal-state programs.221
Medicaid, like the health care industry of which it is a part, is
so large and consumes so much of the state budget that it was
declared coercive for the federal government to require states to
expand the program as a condition of keeping existing Medicaid
dollars.222 The larger the spending program and the more
dependent the state is on federal funding, the less power the
federal government has to require states to agree to expand
such programs before running afoul of federalism concerns,
even if the expansion is almost entirely funded by federal
dollars.223
Another option remains: the federal government could
undertake to finance and administer the health care program
itself through a singlepayer system like Medicare. Although
singlepayer health reform is often derided as politically
infeasible, the ACA has taught us that health reform through
private insurance expansion, with its individual mandate
albatross, is fraught with its own political challenges: a right to
220. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, No. 11-393, slip op. at 35–36
(U.S. June 28, 2012) (listing three factors that made the individual mandate,
in the Court’s opinion, functionally operate as a tax as opposed to a penalty:
(1) the amount of tax relative to the infraction is minimally burdensome
compared to the cost of purchasing insurance; (2) there is no scienter
requirement; and (3) the exaction is collected by the IRS through normal
means of tax collection).
221. Id. at 50–54.
222. Id. at 50–52.
223. Id.
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health care through private coverage must be crafted from a
cabined spectrum of Congressional powers, but easily can be
weighed down with so much complexity that it risks being
incomprehensible to its own beneficiaries.224 A singlepayer
system, funded with taxes and administered by the federal
government, avoids the legal and market challenges of a right
to health care that depends on coordination of private industry,
individuals, and states. Although more politically difficult to
pass through Congress, a single payer right to health care
would have the advantage of quicker delivery of benefits,
stronger interest group support, and a simpler concept for the
public to understand (i.e., Medicare for all). The difference
between the path taken by the ACA and the approach taken by
Medicare might mean the difference between a fragile quasisuperstatute and a durable superstatutory right to health care.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ACA creates a new right to health care for the
uninsured through private insurance market reforms.225 This
expanded right, though momentous in its scope, was
constructed in a way that was politically expedient and
structurally fragile.226 Passed amidst bitter partisan division
and an ambivalent public, the expanded benefits to the
uninsured are poorly understood and slow to be implemented,
while political opposition and opportunity for retrenchment
grows.227 In addition, the right depends on private actors,
private health insurance companies, and willing states to
administer and participate in a newly transparent, competitive,
and streamlined private health insurance market, while these
same actors hesitate to invest in the infrastructure of this
market due to uncertainty from legal and political challenges to
the ACA.228
All of these challenges make it more likely, in the short
term, that the ACA’s right to health care will be ephemeral or
hollow—a quasi-superstatute rather than a durable
superstatute. The ACA’s weaknesses are time-limited and will

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 112.
See supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See id.
See supra Part I.C.
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rapidly diminish if the right to health care survives until
implementation.229 Once implemented, interest groups and
institutional defenders could coalesce around its substantial
benefits and begin to ossify its structure against political
attack.230 The ACA’s fragility highlights the importance of how
such social reforms are structured (or not) to achieve
entrenchment and durability after the ink is dry on the new
legislation. Failed reforms and quasi-superstatutes carry
harms beyond the loss of the promised social good; they
squander political and economic resources and create increased
public distrust in the ability of legislative reform to deliver
durable rights.231

229. See supra Part III.A.
230. See id.
231. See supra Part III.B.

